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Romanticism and Deconstruction: Distant Relations and Elective 
Affinities 
I Introduction 
This essay is about certain affinities between English Romanticism and 
American deconstruction with regard to ideas on the relation of language and 
thought. I shall limit myself to Wordsworth, Coleridge and Shelley on the one 
hand, because they, in addition to their outstanding poetical achievements, went 
furthest in formulating a Romantic poetics, and, on the other hand, to the first-
generation American deconstructors, i.e. Geoffrey Hartman, J. Hillis Miller, the 
late Paul de Man, plus Jacques Derrida as their spiritual godfather and - despite 
his own protestations that he has "no relation whatsoever" to deconstruction 
(Salusinszky 68) - the self-styled critical maverick, Harold Bloom. 
It could of course be objected that English Romanticism had no coherent, mo­
nolithic poetics to which all Romantics could subscribe and that it is also by no 
means certain whether the above-named academics hold enough in common to be 
regarded as a school of criticism (they themselves have variously denied and 
admitted a congruence of their views). The objection is valid in a way, and I would 
go even further and say that ideally one would have to trace in each case -
Romantics and deconstructors - the development of their ideas on language and 
thinking before one could attempt a reasonable comparison or even establish a tie-
in of the two camps. But this work has already been done by others, and I am 
confident that on the basis of it generalization is possible, at least in the particular 
field I have singled out for discussion because it seems to be quintessential both to 
Romanticism and deconstruction. 
The connection between Romanticism and American deconstruction is, as has 
been noted oftentimes before, conspicuously strong and it is evident even on a very 
superficial level: except for Miller, who specializes in Victorian fiction, all the first-
generation American deconstructors are primarily experts in Romanticism. 
Indeed, so strong is the association that Arden Reed, in his introduction to a 
critical anthology on Romanticism and Language, found it necessary to state that 
"Deconstruction, however, has no exclusive claim to the topic of Romanticism and 
language" (18). And yet, when J. Hillis Miller was asked at a symposium on 
deconstruction in 1984, "Do you have any particular thoughts on why 
deconstruction in America has caught on at first primarily among the Victorians 
and people working in Romantic poetry?", he feigned ignorance and answered, 
132 
"Has it? I don't know, Probably purely historical accident" (in Davis/Schleifer, eds., 
87). It is my purpose here to show that this is not so, that it is not mere coincidence 
and that there are good reasons for this mutual attraction - of Romanticists to 
deconstruction and of deconstructors to Romanticism. 
But is it an attraction based on similarities or on differences? Do 
deconstructors find something congenial in Romantic literature (so, for example, 
Grabes, who gives a sophisticated if somewhat cynical reading of their motives) -
or do they turn to it because these texts promise, at first sight, the necessary 
resistance to their deconstructive moves, without which the whole man uvre would 
be pointless (see, for example, Johnston et al., eds., XIV)? 
In a contribution to a symposium on paradox, held at this university three 
months ago, I argued the latter.1 I took the line that deconstruction, as a highly 
paradoxical discourse, turns away from modernist and so-called postmodernist 
literature because that kind of literature displays its own paradoxicality to such a 
degree that there is nothing left for deconstruction to do. These texts playfully 
deconstruct themselves. Bereft of the necessary difference or contrast between 
itself and its material, deconstruction therefore prefers to operate its stratagems on 
a discursive material that looks less like itself. Paradox flees paradox, I argued 
then, and the motto could have been, "opposites attract". Today, I'll argue the 
obverse: I'll argue that in the central field of ideas on language and thought 
Romanticism and deconstruction do share basic convictions; that, because of this, 
they also face similar problems; that, in a way, American deconstruction can be 
regarded as a late offshoot of European Romanticism and that therefore its critical 
preoccupation with Romanticism is, as I said above, by no means pure coincidence, 
but an elective affinity actively pursued by the practitioners of deconstruction. In 
short, my motto for today is, "birds of a feather flock together", and I hope that at 
the end of this and in conjunction with what I said here in July, it will be clear that 
- as in real life - the linkage and attraction between deconstruction and 
Romanticism is all the stronger for its being founded both on similarities and on 
differences. 
II Language as the medium of thought 
In his superb study The Art of Poetry 1750-1820, P.W.R. Stone writes that "the 
Romantic revolution was primarily a revolution in ideas about how poetry 
functions and how it is written" (135) and he identifies as the decisive shift of 
1 Christoph Bode, "Das Paradox in post-mimetischer Literatur und post-strukturalistischer 
Literaturtheorie", Das Paradoxon: Zur geschichtlichen Entfaltung einer Stil- und Denkform, 
ed. Roland Hagenbüchle, Tübingen: Narr, to be published in early 1991. 
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paradigm in this revolution the turning away from the neo-classical conviction that 
language is the dress of thought (cf. Pope, Essay on Criticism, "expression is the 
dress of thought"). No longer do the Romantics believe that tropes and figures can 
be added as adornments to a central core of meaning which remains basically 
unaltered and unaffected by these rhetorical trappings: the same idea, the 
Romantics contend, cannot be expressed in various ways and still remain the same 
idea. The Romantics bid adieu to the dualistic view of "ideas clothed in suitable 
language" and insist that the two - language and thinking - are inseparably 
connected. The expression of an idea is not accessory to it (Stone 50), nor is 
language extraneous to thinking. Rather, language is the very medium in which 
thinking takes place. Language is the way in which we conceive the world, it is the 
manifestation of our relation to it. 
This shift of paradigm in poetics is so well-documented and convincingly ex­
pounded by Stone that I need hardly adduce further evidence for it. What I shall 
do instead is delineate some of the consequences, both positive and negative, 
promising and disturbing, this change in outlook had for the Romantic poets. 
First, if language is the medium of thought and the manifestation of our being-
in-the-world, then its state is also indicative of the state of society at any given time 
(cf. Humboldt: "Die Sprache ist durchaus kein bloßes Verständigungsmittel, 
sondern der Abdruck des Geistes und der Weltansicht der Redenden."). Criticism 
of the one implies criticism of the other, and vice versa. Therefore, it is only 
consequent that Wordsworth, at the beginning of his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, 
says that 
it would be necessary to give a full account of the present state of the public taste 
in this country, and to determine how far this taste is healthy or depraved; which, 
again, could not be determined, without pointing out in what manner language 
and the human mind act and re-act on each other, and without retracing the 
revolutions, not of literature alone, but likewise of society itself. (1: 121) 
Against this backdrop, his decision to revert to "the real language of men" is a 
move in cultural politics,2 directed against those whose mistaken belief in the 
2 It is well known that Coleridge was highly critical of what he deemed to be a certain naivete 
on the part of his friend. In the conspectus to chapter 17 of his Biogjraphia Literana he wrote, 
"Rustic life (above all, low and rustic life) especially unfavourable to the formation of a human 
diction - The best parts of language the product of philosophers, not clowns or shepherds", and 
then elaborated: "It is, moreover, to be considered that to the formation of healthy feelings, 
and a reflecting mind, negations involve impediments not less formidable, than 
sophistication and vicious intermixture. I am convinced, that for the human soul to prosper in 
rustic life, a certain vantage-ground is pre-requisite. It is not every man that is likely to be 
improved by a country life or by country labours. Education, or original sensibility, or both, 
must pre-exist, if the changes, forms, and incidents of nature are to prove a sufficient 
stimulant. And where these are not sufficient, the mind contracts and hardens by want of 
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separateness of language and thought spreads corruption, as he points out in his 
third "Essay on Epitaphs": 
Words are too awful an instrument for good and evil to be trifled with: they hold 
above all other external powers a dominion over thoughts. If words be not (...) an 
incarnation of the thought but only a clothing for it, then surely will they prove an 
ill gift; such a one as those poisoned vestments, read of in the stories of 
superstitious times, which had power to consume and alienate from his right 
mind the victim who put them on. Language, if it do not uphold, and feed, and 
leave in quiet, like the power of gravitation or the air we breathe, is a counter-
spirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work to derange, to subvert, to lay waste, 
to vitiate, and to dissolve. (2: 84/85) 
It is only because expressions are "not what the garb is to the body, but what 
the body is to the soul" (2: 84), that an enormous responsibility is placed on the 
shoulders of the poet: As expressions are a "constituent part and power or function 
in the thought" (2: 84), poetry - as language at its most "languagy" - is seen as "the 
breath and finer spirit of all knowledge", or "the first and last of all knowledge", 
stimulants; and the man becomes selfish, sensual, gross, and hard-hearted. (...) Whatever 
may be concluded on the other side, from the stronger local attachments and enterprising 
spirit of the Swiss, and other mountaineers, applies to a particular mode of pastoral life, 
under forms of property, that permit and beget manners truly republican, not to rustic life in 
general, or to the absence of artificial cultivation. On the contrary the mountaineers, whose 
manners have been so often eulogized, are in general better educated and greater readers 
than men of equal rank elsewhere. But where this is not the case, as among the peasantry of 
North Wales, the ancient mountains, with all their terrors and all their glories are pictures to 
the blind, and music to the deaf (2: 44,45)." In other words, Coleridge admits the potential 
but insists that there must be additional conditions fulfilled before this potential can be 
realized. As long as these conditions are not given, "the best part of human language" as a 
sign system whose capability depends on differentiation and refinement (cf. my second point, 
below) is to be found not in rustic life but elsewhere: "(...) if to communicate with an object 
implies such an acquaintance with it, as renders it capable of being discriminately reflected 
on; the distinct knowledge of an uneducated rustic would furnish a very scanty vocabulary. 
The few things, and modes of action, requisite for his bodily conveniences, would alone be 
individualized; while all the rest of nature would be expressed by a small number of 
confused, general terms. Secondly, I deny that the words and combinations of words derived 
from the objects, with which the rustic is familiar, whether with distinct or confused 
knowledge, can be justly said to form the best part of language. It is more than probable, 
that many classes of the brute creation possess discriminating sounds, by which they can 
convey to each other notices of such objects as concern their food, shelter, or safety. Yet we 
hesitate to call the aggregate of such sounds a language, otherwise than metaphorically. The 
best part of human language, properly so called, is derived from reflection on the acts of the 
mind itself. It is formed by a voluntary appropriation of fixed symbols to internal acts, to 
processes and results of imagination, the greater part of which have no place in the 
consciousness of uneducated man; though in civilized society, by imagination and passive 
remembrance of what they hear from their religious instructors and other superiors, the 
most uneducated share in the harvest which they neither sowed or reaped. (2: 53/54)." 
Wordsworth, obviously, is far more concerned about the general drift of society as reflected 
in its language, whereas Coleridge has no illusions about pockets of unalienated, 
un corrupted language. But despite their differences in this point, both share the basic 
conviction that language and thinking are virtually inseparable (for Coleridge's view cf. 
Goodson). 
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and consequently the poet, in an age of linguistic and social alienation, becomes 
"the rock of defence for human nature" (1: 141): 
For a multitude of causes, unknown to former times, are now acting with a 
combined force to blunt the discriminating powers of the mind, and, unfitting it 
for all voluntary exertion, to reduce it to a state of almost savage torpor. The 
most effective of these causes are the great national events which are daily taking 
place, and the increasing accumulation of men in cities, where the uniformity of 
their occupations produces a craving for extraordinary incident, which the rapid 
communication of intelligence hourly gratifies. (1:129) 
The same idea of poetry as an antidote to alienation is elaborated in Shelley's 
Defence of Poetry. 
Second, if thinking takes place in language and poetry is a way of thinking, then 
the poet's occupation is never a merely defensive one. Working in language, he is 
forever refining and differentiating its possibilities by refining and differentiating 
its organization. Forever pushing the borders of what can be said, he, at the same 
time, expands the realms of what can be thought, perceived and imagined. In this 
sense, all Romantic poetry is border poetry - it is engaged in the dialectics that 
mediates between the sayable and the yet unsayable (see Frank, Das Sagbare ): By 
converting the latter into the former, it constantly re-defines the frontiers of our 
universe of discourse and knowledge (see Frank, Frühromantische Ästhetik 24, on 
Heidegger: "Das Kunstwerk erschließt uns eine Welt des noch nicht Gesagten") 
and thereby contributes to the giant poem which is the history of the evolution of 
mankind and consciousness.3 
Certainly the idea that the world is nature's laboratory for bringing about con­
sciousness, which then, reflexively applied to itself, ascends and expands in ever 
widening circles, is most pertinent in Shelley, all the way from Queen Mab to 
Defence of Poetry, which idealistically prefigures Marx's "Die Bildung der fünf 
Sinne ist eine Arbeit der ganzen bisherigen Weltgeschichte" (1: 119). 
But when Coleridge and Wordsworth decided to split up their task in the 
Lyrical Ballads - Coleridge showing the penetration of the supernatural into the 
ordinary, Wordsworth presenting "ordinary things (...) to the mind in an unusual 
This idea that language is an evolving system, forever differentiating itself, seems to go back 
to Condillac (cf. Aarsleff, Study of Language, and From Locke to Saussure ). Cf. also A.W. 
Schlegel, Über Literatur 96, 97: "Die Sprache ist kein Produkt der Natur, sondern ein 
Abdruck des menschlichen Geistes, der darin die Entstehung und Verwandtschaft seiner 
Vorstellungen und den ganzen Mechanismus seiner Operationen niederlegt. Es wird also in 
der Poesie schon Gebildetes wieder gebildet; und die Bildsamkeit ihres Organs ist ebenso 
grenzenlos als die Fähigkeit des Geistes zur Rückkehr auf sich selbst durch immer höhere 
potenziellere Reflexionen. (...) Ja, man kann ohne Übertreibung und Paradoxic sagen, daß 
eigentlich alle Poesie, Poesie der Poesie sei; denn sie setzt schon die Sprache voraus, deren 
Erfindung doch der poetischen Anlage angehört, die selbst ein immer werdendes, sich 
verwandelndes, nie vollendetes Gedicht des gesamten Menschengeschlechtes ist." 
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aspect" (1: 123, cf. also Coleridge's Biographia Literaria Ch. 14) -, they both 
subscribed to the same Romantic aesthetics as Shelley did, viz. essentially an 
aesthetics of defamiliarization: 
And therefore is it the prime merit of genius and its most unequivocal mode of 
manifestation, so to represent familiar objects as to awaken in the minds of 
others a kindred feeling concerning them and that freshness of sensation which is 
the constant accompaniment of mental, no less than bodily convalescence. 
(Coleridge 1:81) 
(Cf. Novalis: "Die Kunst, auf angenehme Art zu befremden, einen Gegenstand 
fremd zu machen und doch bekannt und anziehend, das ist die romantische 
Poetik.") 
It is extremely important to note that a poetics of defamiliarization makes 
sense only if one believes in the power of language to restructure the world for us, 
to be cognitively productive through linguistic innovation. In the beginning, thus 
Shelley in Defence of Poetry, all language was poetry, but its association 
continually lost freshness through habitual use. Poets work against this tendency 
towards automatization (cf. Novalis again: "Alle Poesie unterbricht den 
gewöhnlichen Zustand, das gemeine Leben, fast wie der Schlummer, um uns zu 
erneuern und so unser Lebensgefühl immer rege zu halten.") and marvellously in 
this process more is gained than lost: "[Poetry] awakens and enlarges the mind 
itself by rendering it the receptacle of a thousand unapprehended combinations of 
thought" (Shelley 282). The unprecedented notion of "poetic thought" is correlative 
to the idea of language as the medium of thinking. Coleridge's strictures on Pope -
"the matter and diction seemed to me characterized not so much by poetic 
thoughts as by thoughts translated into the language of poetry" (1:19) - presuppose 
that original thinking can only take place on the outskirts of what has already been 
said. True poetry is beyond what has been articulated up till now, and therefore -
because it is radically and irreducibly new and different and could not be said 
otherwise - it cannot be retranslated into "other words of the same language" 
(Coleridge 1: 23) without loss of meaning. This insight into the essential 
untranslatability of poetry forms the backbone of the Romantic theory of organic 
form. The indissoluble relation between part and whole of a text corresponds to 
the same intimate coupling of language and thought: "(...) it would be scarcely 
more difficult to push a stone out of the pyramids with the bare hand, than to alter 
a word, or the position of a word, in Milton or Shakespeare (...) without making 
the author say something else, or something worse, than he does say" (Coleridge 1: 
23). 
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But if language is productive and not merely reproductive, if it structures the 
world for us and - via poetry - opens up new possibilities of looking at it, then it 
becomes understandable why, for Shelley at least, a new flowering of literature is a 
sign of an approaching social revolution (cf. Preface to Prometheus Unbound and 
Defence of Poetry). As all true poetry is directed towards what is not yet, it is 
intrinsically prophetic; and as it is its supreme task to bring into existence what is 
not yet there, it is only legitimate to extend the meaning of the word "poetry" and 
apply it synecdochically to all creation: 
Poetry is the record of the best and happiest moments of the happiest and best 
minds. (...) [For] Poets (...) are not only the authors of language and of music, of 
the dance and architecture and statuary and painting: they are the institutors of 
laws, and the founders of civil society and the inventors of the arts of life and tea-
chers, who draw into a certain propinquity with the beautiful and the true that 
partial apprehension of the agencies of the invisible world which is called 
religion. (...) Poetry is indeed something divine. It is at once the centre and 
circumference of knowledge; it is that which comprehends all science and that to 
which all science must be referred. It is at the same time the root and blossom of 
all other systems of thought; it is that from which all spring, and that which 
adorns all; and that which, if blighted, denies the fruit and the seed, and with­
holds from the barren world the nourishment and the succession of the scions of 
the tree of life. (Shelley 294,279,293) 
When Coleridge characterizes the primary imagination "as a repetition in the 
finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM" (1: 304), he points to 
the same continuity of the poetic-creative principle.4 
Third, the idea of language as the medium of thought is concomitant with a 
new epistemology. Just as language and thought are seen as inseparable, so mind 
and reality are conceived of as being dialectically entwined in a continual process 
of interchange: Cognition is the confluence of mind and external world (cf. 
Hartman, Unmediated Vision 25, 26). And if it is rewarding to listen in "a wise 
passiveness" to "this mighty sum of things for ever speaking" (Wordsworth, 
"Expostulation and Reply") and to cultivate "a heart that watches and receives" 
("The Tables Turned"), this is only because "man and nature [are] essentially 
adapted to each other" (Wordsworth 1:140) and because the eternal language of 
nature corresponds to something in man that strives to realize itself: 
(...) so shalt thou see and hear 
The lovely sounds and shapes intelligible 
Of the eternal language, which thy God 
Cf. F.Schlegel: "Es gibt (...) eine Art des Denkens, die etwas produziert und daher mit dem 
schöpferischen Vermögen, das wir dem Ich der Natur und dem Welt-Ich zuschreiben, große 
Ähnlichkeit der Form hat. Das Dichten nämlich; dies erschafft gewissermaßen seinen Stoff 
selbst." Or Novalis: "Dichtkunst ist wohl nur willkürlicher, tätiger, produktiver Gebrauch 
unserer Organe - und vielleicht wäre Denken selbst nicht viel etwas anderes - und Denken 
und Dichten also einerlei." Both quoted in Benjamin 63,64 resp. 
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Utters, who from eternity doth teach 
Himself in all, and all things in himself. 
Great universal Teacher! he shall mould 
Thy spirit, and by giving make it ask. 
(Coleridge, "Frost at Midnight") 
It is true that intermittently in Wordsworth we still find the image of the mind as a 
mere mirror of external reality (so, for example, in the continuation of the passage 
just quoted from the Preface ). But that is a mechanistic residue. Increasingly, the 
dialectical nature of perception and understanding is foregrounded. See, for 
example: 
(...) all the mighty world 
of eye and ear, - both what they half create, 
And what perceive (...) 
(Wordsworth, Tintera Abbey") 
Or in Coleridge's "Frost at Midnight", when the fluttering film of soot is depicted 
as 
(...) a companionable form 
Whose puny flaps and freaks the idling Spirit 
By its own moods interprets, everywhere 
Echo or mirror seeking of itself, 
And makes a toy of thought. 
Or, finally in Shelley's "Mont Blanc": 
My own, my human mind, which passively 
Now renders and receives fast influencings, 
Holding an unremitting interchange 
With the clear universe of things around 
- a seeming subordination of the mind, which is dialectically overturned in the last 
three lines of the poem: 
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, 
If to the human mind's imaginings 
Silence and solitude were vacancy? 
The human mind does not create the outer world, but it structures it and 
invests it with meaning, so that "nothing exists but as it is perceived" (Shelley 173). 
This, however, brings about some problems and I will now turn to the more 
disturbing consequences of "language as the medium of thought". If language and 
thought are coextensive, if we live in a linguistic universe that defines and 
prestructures our experience, how can we ever be sure that what we know is 
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"really" true and not just a subjective (or collective) delusion? How can we ever 
know what lies outside the scope of language and beyond the pale of expression? If 
all is language and there is no outside to language that one could express, then the 
moment of terrible truth is finally there: It is the moment when the Romantics' 
excessive pan-lingualism - and I should say any pan-lingualism - collapses into utter 
linguistic and epistemological scepticism and doubt, the moment our linguistic 
universe is recognized to be what it "really" is: a prison-house to which we are 
confined. The next part deals with attempts to break out. 
Ill The limits of expression 
If all Romantic poetry is, in a way, border poetry, forever working on the limits 
of expression and converting the not yet sayable into the sayable, then it is well 
prepared, even predestined to engage in the absolute. For the Romantics, it was 
poetry rather than philosophy, let alone science, that could attempt the impossible: 
to bring back that which is by definition outside its realm (cf. F. Schlegel: "Die 
Nichterkennbarkeit des Absoluten ist also eine identische Trivialität", quoted in 
Frank, Frühromantische Ästhetik 158) into the world of discourse, to represent the 
infinite in finite terms. If the infinite and absolute can by definition never be 
presented or expressed as it is, then all presentation of it must be allegorical (cf. F. 
Schlegel: "Das Höchste kann man eben, weil es unaussprechlich ist, nur allegorisch 
sagen", quoted in Hörisch 160). Poetry, and by extension all art, is allegorical of the 
absolute in that it is a) essentially inexhaustible by interpretation ("Die 
unausschöpfliche Sinnfülle ist Allegorie des Unbegreiflichen." Frank, Das Sagbare 
158), and b) always in the state of becoming, so that it always points beyond itself 
(F. Schlegel, Schriften 37, 38: "Die romantische Poesie ist eine progressive 
Universalpoesie. [...] Die romantische Dichtart ist noch im Werden; ja das ist ihr 
eigentliches Wesen, daß sie ewig nur werden, nie vollendet sein kann."). Poetry 
thematizes, as Schlegel says, the impossibility and necessity to depict the absolute, 
to utter the unutterable in spite of all (cf. Frank, Frühromantische Ästhetik 364). 
Knowing what it does, it self-reflexively becomes a medium for the absolute (cf. 
Behler, "Kunst der Reflexion" 219, Benjamin 37): "[Es ist] nur poetisch darüber 
noch sinnvoll zu reden, worüber szientifisch nur zu schweigen wäre." (F. Schlegel 
quoted in Hörisch 89). "Es ist in Erinnerung zu bringen, daß die Notwendigkeit der 
Poesie sich auf das Bedürfnis gründet, welches aus der Unvollkommenheit der 
Philosophie hervorgeht, das Un-endliche darzustellen." (F. Schlegel quoted in 
Frank, Frühromantische Ästhenk 306), "Wo die Philosophie aufhört, muß die 
Poesie anfangen." (ibid.). Manfred Frank summarizes: "Nur der Kunst gelingt das 
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Unmögliche, ein Un- darstellbares dennoch darzustellen, und zwar in seiner 
Undarstellbarkeit." (Frühromantische Ästhetik 158). 
For reasons of time and space, I reluctantly refrain from discussing in this 
context the importance of the Romantic theory of symbols - as the language of 
transcendental truth - and the concept of Romantic irony as an indispensable part 
of a poetics and a literary mode "that draws attention to its own limi- tations" 
(Mellor, Irony 25, see also McFarland, Romanticism, Mellor, "Irony", and Simpson, 
Irony). Suffice it here to say that "the whole invoked by the symbol" or allegory 
remains, of course, "impenetrable" (McFarland, Romanticism 33) and that 
sometimes the irony turns bitter (or exists only in the eye of the beholder). 
What I shall do instead is sketch briefly three other forms in which the 
Romantic desire for totality and the absolute, for "unmediated vision" (Hartman), 
ultimately manifests itself as failure and deficiency, three forms in which we see 
that the highest demands the Romantics had on language resulted, for them, 
primarily in an awareness of the poverty and inadequacy of their expressions (cf. 
Gleckner). The first form is the poetry of marking time (the ambiguity is 
deliberate) as we find it in Wordsworth, the second is the poetry of despair and 
fragmentation, as in Coleridge, and the third a poetry perpetually reaching out and 
overreaching itself, as in Shelley. 
Wordsworth's theory of poetic creation, as you all know, attaches highest im­
portance to the poet's subjectivity. But it is exactly because creativity is founded on 
subjectivity that it is extremely vulnerable and constantly endangered. If poetry 
depends on the capacity to experience intensely certain spots of time, to recollect 
and relive that emotion in tranquillity and finally to find expression for it, then the 
creative process may break down at any of the three points - and it does: First goes 
the capacity to experience "unmediatedly", then the capacity to at least revive those 
past experiences, then, inevitably, because the ground is lacking, the gift of words. 
A poet thus practising his art lives, as Basil Willey once observed, on capital. 
It has been said that "subjectivity or self-consciousness is the salient problem of 
Romanticism" (Bloom in Bloom, ed., Romanticism and Consciousness 1). It is, in a 
double sense: "Wordsworth", writes Geoffrey Hartman, "cannot find his [great 
objective] theme because he already has it: himself." (in Bloom, ed., Romanticism 
and Consciousness 53); or, more drastically, in Bloom's words, "Wordsworth's 
Copernican revolution in poetry is marked by the evanescence of any subject but 
subjectivity, the loss of what a poem is 'about'" (Romanticism and Consciousness 
8). Therefore, it is so extremely significant, indeed paradigmatic, that 
Wordsworth's Prelude, the poem on the growth of his own mind, is not a prelude 
at all, but turns out to be the main thing, not the ante-chapel, but already the 
cathedral. The two-faced problem is that once you root your poetry firmly in your 
141 
subjectivity, there is, practically speaking, no other subject, nothing to follow, 
because whatever you thematize will be that something in relation to your 
subjectivity; and, second, the resulting poetry must be one of loss, it must be 
retrospective and consumptive. Heaven lies in infancy, growing up is growing less 
and offers small recompense, despite the poet's interspersed protestations to the 
contrary: 
It is not now as it hath been of yore; -
Turn wheresoe'er I may, 
By night or day, 
The things which I have seen I now can see no more. 
(...) 
(...) I know, where'er I go, 
That there hath passed away a glory from the earth. 
(...) 
Whither is fled the visionary gleam? 
Where is it now, the glory and the dream? 
("Ode: Intimations of Immortality") 
Wordsworth begins with radical subjective idealism: 
I was often unable to think of external things as having external existence, and I 
communed with all that I saw as something not apart from, but inherent in, my 
own immaterial nature. Many times while going to school have I grasped at a 
wall or tree to recall myself from this abyss of idealism to the reality. (Preface to 
"Ode: Intimations of Immortality")^  
Then there are his attempts at the absolute, epiphany, moments when he looks 
into the life of things, has a sense sublime of something far more deeply interfused, 
thoughts too deep for tears, and when he knows that "our destiny (...) Is with 
infinitude, and only there." (Prelude [1850] VI, 11. 605/606). But in the end, 
contrary to all these attempts at verbally conjuring up a sense of the absolute, yet 
represented as the culmination of all these attempts, we are given the following in 
the very last lines of the Prelude : in looking back a prospect of 
(...) how the mind of Man becomes 
A thousand times more beautiful than the earth 
Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein quoted in Geier 177: "Ich kann mir wohl denken, was Heidegger mit 
Sein und Angst meint. Der Mensch hat den Trieb, gegen die Grenzen der Sprache 
anzurennen. Denken Sie z.B. an das Erstaunen, daß etwas existiert. Das Erstaunen kann 
nicht in Form einer Frage ausgedrückt werden, und es gibt auch gar keine Antwort. Alles, 
was wir sagen mögen, kann a priori nur Unsinn sein. Trotzdem rennen wir gegen die Grenze 
der Sprache an. Dieses Anrennen hat auch Kierkegaard gesehen und es sogar ganz ähnlich 
(als Anrennen gegen das Paradoxon) bezeichnet. Aber die Tendenz, das Anrennen deutet 
auf etwas hin. Das hat schon der heilige Augustin gewußt, wenn er sagt: "Was, Du Mistvieh, 
du willst keinen Unsinn reden? Rede nur einen Unsinn, es macht nichts." 
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On which he dwells, above this frame of things (...) 
In beauty exalted, as it is itself 
Of quality and fabric more divine 
(Prelude [1850] XIV, U.450ff.) 
It is, all trappings aside, the apotheosis of the human mind, of subjectivity. 
In chapter 22 of Biographia Literana, Coleridge lists the various defects of 
Wordsworth's poetry. Groups four and five are particularly interesting in this 
context: 
[the fourth class of defects] are such as arise likewise from an intensity of feeling 
disproportionate to such knowledge and value of the objects described, as can be 
fairly anticipated of men in general, even of the most cultivated class. (...) In this 
class, I comprize occasional prolixity, repetition, and an eddying, instead of 
progression, of thought. (2:136) 
In other words, Wordsworth, so it seems to the reader, is marking time. Coleridge 
continues, 
Fifth and last; thoughts and images too great for the subject. This is an ap­
proximation to what might be called mental bombast, as distinguished from 
verbal; for, as in the latter there is a disproportion of the expressions to the 
thoughts, so in this there is a disproportion of thought to the circumstance and 
occasion." (2:136) 
What Coleridge does not see is that Wordsworth's marking time and his mental 
and verbal bombast is not a personal shortcoming, but the inevitable effect (it 
would be wrong to only call it a side-effect) of a poetry yearning to say more than 
can actually be said. Lost for words, it rambles on. The fault is not individual, but 
systematic. But then, Coleridge was ever ready to see personal inadequacy, 
especially where he himself was concerned. 
I will pass by "Dejection: An Ode" - that superb thematization of loss of crea­
tive power as personal fault ("I may not hope from outward forms to win/ The 
passion and the life, whose fountains are within./ Ο Lady! we receive but what we 
give,/ And in our life alone does Nature live.") - and turn to Coleridge's "Kubla 
Khan" instead, as befits the great fragmentarist (see again McFarland, 
Romanticism ). 
"Kubla Khan" - poem and preface - must be the ultimate document of the in­
evitable failure to transfer what is beyond conception back to everyday reality: 
Could I revive within me 
Her symphony and song, 
To such a deep delight 'twould win me, 
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That with music loud and long, 
I would build that dome in air, 
That sunny dome! those caves of ice! 
And all who heard should see them there, 
And all should cry, Beware! Beware! 
His flashing eyes, his floating hair! 
Weave a circle round him thrice, 
And close your eyes with holy dread, 
For he on honeydew hath fed, 
And drunk the milk of Paradise. 
(11.42ff.) 
Threefold the poet is barred from success: He cannot revive the maiden's song 
and find those extraordinary expressions adequate to his vision; but even if he 
could, he would be more likely to cause consternation and fear and find himself in 
isolation from his public; and even if that would not preclude a partaking in the 
secondary vision of "all who heard" - there would always be, back in reality, a 
visitor from Porlock, annihilating the greatest part of what was salvaged. If the 
neighbour from Porlock is not Romanticism's most impressive personification of 
the reality principle, then he is at least its greatest bogeyman: To all intents, he 
never existed, and the causes of Romantic fragmentation are elsewhere to be 
found - they are inherent and implied in the poetic philosophy of "language as the 
medium of thought". 
And so are the causes of a poetry that 
frequently attempts to describe that which is beyond description - a depth beyond 
depth, a height beyond height, a timelessness beyond time, a boundless space, all 
the features of a universe which we can stretch to imagine but cannot 
satisfactorily find words to compass. (...) a poetry which moves with great speed; 
its characteristic effects are not those of logic or fixed clarity, but of a changing 
sensibility confronting an ever-changing world. It is a fitting poetry for an age of 
relativity: poet, reader, subject, engage in an endless process of interaction 
(Watson 225) -
it is, of course, the poetry of P.B. Shelley. There is probably no other Romantic 
poet in whom we witness such a fascinating struggle with language in order to 
wrest new meaning from it. Here is language in the making. Knowing that the 
poet's language is vitally metaphorical (cf. Shelley 278) but also that "language is 
arbitrarily produced by the imagination and has relation to thoughts alone" (279),6 
he staked all on figurai mobility, neologisms and endlessly cascading periods of 
The idea that language consists of arbitrary signs seems to have been extremely troubling to 
Coleridge, cf. his letter to Godwin, quoted in Jonathan Wordsworth 218: "Is thinking 
impossible without arbitrary signs? and how far is the word 'arbitrary a misnomer? (...) [You 
should] endeavour to destroy the old antithesis of words and things, elevating, as it were, 
words into things, and living things too." 
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speech (see Hogle) to dynamize and set in motion his linguistic universe. In all 
this, Shelley saw that "What thou art we know not", but kept asking, "What is most 
like thee?" ('To a Skylark", emphasis added) and piled simile upon simile, forever 
circumscribing, forever encircling the elusive inexpressible. 
The enormous tension in Romantic poetics becomes apparent when the poet is 
seen as an active agent, an unacknowledged legislator, on the one hand, and as a 
mere instrument - preferably a lyre or Aeolean harp - on the other. Submission 
and hybris are intractably intertwined, and so are impotence and omnipotence. In 
Prometheus Unbound, it is Demogorgon who speaks the verdict on poetry's 
endeavours to reach the absolute: 
(...) If the Abysm 
Could vomit forth its secrets: - but a voice 
Is wanting, the deep truth is imageless (II, 11.114-116). 
And yet, in "Hymn of Apollo", Shelley could write of the god of poetry and the arts, 
I am the eye with which the universe 
beholds itself and knows itself divine; 
All harmony of instrument or verse, 
All prophecy, all medicine is mine, 
All light of art or nature; - to my song 
Victory and praise in its own right belong. 
Up till now I hope to have shown that the successes and failures of the 
Romantic poets can be regarded as direct results of their ideas on the relation of 
language and thought, and in particular that the resulting paradoxes, aporias and 
contradictions were inevitable in the sense that they could by no means have been 
avoided once this view had been adopted, stopping short of not thinking it through 
at all.This is Goethe: 
"Wie hast du's denn so weit gebracht? 
Sie sagen, du habest es gut vollbracht!" 
Mein Kind! ich hab' es klug gemacht, 
Ich habe nie über das Denken gedacht. (1: 329) 
The deconstructors, to whom I now turn, think a lot about thinking and language, 
but they have also got very far, in academic circles at least. 
IV Deconstruction 
If language is, as de Saussure taught, all form and no substance, a system of 
differences without positive terms, then meaning can never simply be "there", it is 
an effect "of an endless play of signifiers that refer not to signifieds but to other 
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signifiers" (Lawson 98). The whole dynamic structure could only be arrested and 
meaning could only be fixed, if there were a stable centre whose meaning did not 
depend on its relations to other signs, but was given as a self-defining origin, 
"meaningful in itself (Moi 106). Of course, argues Derrida, there is no such thing. 
There is no centre to language and thought that is unconditionally there, no 
"transcendental signifier" that stands outside the relativistic cosmos of language 
and is thereby the foundation and guarantor for stable meaning. 
Yet the history of Western metaphysics, claims Derrida, is a history of attempts 
to center the structure, to name an origin: "essence, existence, substance, subject, 
cdetheiOy transcendentality, consciousness or conscience, God, man and so forth." 
(Derrida in Davis, ed., 482). Deconstruction is a way to show that these attempts 
won't do, that whenever a privileged, purportedly self-defining sign is set up, it 
cannot help but subliminally speak about its "other", which is suppressed or 
denigrated, but inevitably steals back into the discourse. "Deconstruction", says 
Raman Seiden, "locate[s] the moment when a text transgresses the laws it appears to 
set up for itself At this point texts go to pieces, so to speak" (Seiden 87). Or, in 
Hilary Lawson's words, "Deconstruction, at its simplest, consists of reading a text 
so closely that the conceptual distinctions, on which the text relies, are shown to 
fail on account of the inconsistent and paradoxical employment of these very 
concepts within the text as a whole. Thus the text is seen to fall by its own criteria -
the standards or definitions which the text sets up are used reflexively to unsettle 
and shatter the original distinctions" (93). 
Historically, the moment the centre is revealed as a function only, no "real" 
presence, a kind of linguistic involution takes place. For lack of a transcendental 
signifier, everything becomes discourse (see Derrida in Davis, ed., 482). "Il n'y a pas 
de hors-texte", there is no outside the text (Derrida, Grammatologie 274) because 
it has no identifiable limits. The limit you could identify by language would be no 
limit. 
This linguistic turn has a number of far-reaching consequences. The first is that 
even seemingly stable notions like the subject or the self have to be conceived of as 
effects of an ultimately linguistic structure; as J. Hillis Miller says, "the self is a 
function primarily of language" (in Fischer/Eaves, eds., 124). Once this is accepted 
it is only consequential to profess, as Derrida did, "I don't believe in perception" 
(in Davis, ed., 497) or, 7 do not select. The interpretations select themselves" 
(Kearns/Newton 21) or to say, as Geoffrey Hartman does, 
(...) what survives in this graveyard of meanings is not simply a will, but 
specifically the will to write. (...) Language itself, nothing else, or the Nothing 
that is language, is the motivating residue. Despite obsolete and atrophied words, 
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and falsified, disputable, or undecidable meanings, the will to write persists. 
(Saving XXIV) 
But doesn't that sound suspiciously like a new absolute point of reference -
language "as such"? It does, and it indicates the second consequence: the centre is 
only a function, agreed, but it is virtually indispensable (cf. Derrida in Davis, ed., 
497). Not only must the deconstructor make use of the very system of thought and 
language that he sets out to deconstruct - there is no other -, not only must he 
engage in the terms he means to discredit, but there is always the imminent and 
inescapable danger of "centring" one's own discourse, so that it becomes itself an 
object for further deconstructions, or deconstructs itself. Deconstruction is an 
inherently paradoxical enterprise. When it succeeds, it fails, and its failure is its 
ultimate success. Deconstruction turns language against itself (cf. Ν orris, 
Deconstruction 18ff.) and it turns metaphysical thinking against itself. It is confined 
to the very language and concepts it seeks to disparage and knows to be delusory 
(Derrida in Davis, ed., 482/483: "There is no sense in doing without the concepts of 
metaphysics in order to attack metaphysics. We have no language - no syntax and 
no lexicon - which is alien to this history; we cannot utter a single destructive 
proposition which has not already slipped into the form, the logic, and the implicit 
postulation of precisely what it seeks to contest"). 
Good deconstructive readings show in how far concrete texts are self-contra­
dictory and, what is more, point to the fact that they cannot help but be so - but 
these readings claim no privileged status for themselves, they do not claim to have 
escaped the prison-house of language, to have found a ground beyond language 
where its conditions are not in force. "Deconstruction", says J. Hillis Miller, "does 
not promise liberation from that famous prison house of language, only a different 
way of living within it" ("Theory and Practice" 612/613). In deconstruction we 
encounter, for a second time now, the ultimate paradox or aporia of an excessive 
pan-lingualism or pan-textualism (see, for example, Hartman, "Communication" 
16: "Imagine a world in which you cannot think except by reading and writing. That 
is our world."), the paradox that becomes apparent the moment when "all is 
language" or "we know only through language" is recognized to entail "it doesn't 
allow us to step outside, to see things as they 'really' are", the moment when the 
all-encompassing power of language and reason can only be used to express their 
utter impotence: We can never know what "really" is the case - but that, at least, we 
know. Again, cheerful optimism collapses into utter linguistic and epistemological 
scepticism. If meaning is only "inside" a system and is only an effect of a structure 
perpetually deferring closure, then - and this brings me to the third consequence -
meaning is ultimately undecidable, and the office of the critic can only be to trace 
its trace and to show how texts necessarily deny what they assert. Always looking 
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for that "excess over assigned meaning" (Hartman in Bloom et al. VII), 
deconstruction becomes what Paul Ricur once called a "hermeneutics of 
suspicion" (cf. Davis/Schleifer, eds., 80): No text means only what it says, nor does 
it even mean what it says. What a field day for interpreters! 
If all texts contain a plurality of meanings and, what is more, meanings that 
cancel each other out, then reading in the sense of "a single, definitive, univocal 
interpretation" (Miller, "Host" 447) becomes an impossibility. If all readings are 
impositions, then there can only be misreadings, doubly in error: "all readings are 
in error because they assume" - in addition to that of their texts - "their own 
readability" (de Man, Allegories 202). The idea of the "unreadability" or 
"undecidability" of texts is one that all American deconstructors subscribe to. It 
derives only in part from the Derridean line of thought I gave you above, but in 
addition it draws heavily on Nietzsche's scepticist discussion of the irreducible 
figurality and rhetoricity of language, as presented, for example, in "Über Wahrheit 
und Lüge im außermoralischen Sinne". This point is of extreme importance here 
because Nietzsche's famous answer to "Was ist Wahrheit?" -
Ein bewegliches Heer von Metaphern, Metonymien, Anthropomorphismen, kurz 
eine Summe von menschlichen Relationen, die, poetisch und rhetorisch 
gesteigert, übertragen, geschmückt wurden, und die nach langem Gebrauch 
einem Volke fest, kanonisch und verbindlich dünken: die Wahrheiten sind 
Illusionen, von denen man vergessen hat, daß sie welche sind, Metaphern, die 
abgenutzt und sinnlich kraftlos geworden sind, Münzen, die ihr Bild verloren 
haben und nun als Metall, nicht mehr als Münze in Betracht kommen (4: 546). -
this answer, I say, insists on the unattainability of truth through language on 
account of its inherent figurality: There is only interpretation, because all language 
is irreducibly "uneigentlich". The prison-house of language is locked twice. Or, to 
couch it in the classic Zen koan, "The word that you can say is not the Word." 
This has two momentous consequences for deconstructive criticism: If lan­
guage is tropical and rhetorical through and through (cf. de Man in Sacks, ed.), 
then it is fatuous to draw a dividing line between literature and commentary and to 
assign to one discourse exclusively the feature both ineradicably share. As "literary" 
texts deconstruct themselves ("Poetic writing is the most advanced and refined 
mode of deconstruction." de Man, "Semiology" 32), deconstructive commentary 
accompanies them and assimilates itself to them - it crosses a border that was 
illusory all along (see de Man, "Semiology", Hartman, "Crossing Over"). 
The second consequence is that the impasse of figurality brings up the problem 
of referentiality again: If the referential function of language in general is more of 
a problem than a solid stepping stone, it would be all the more absurd to analyze 
poetic texts under their "referential" aspect, whatever that may be. The genuine 
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study of literary texts, so the deconstructors, can only mean an elucidation of their 
rhetorical dimension, in the widest sense of the word. In its rejection of extrinsic 
approaches and its concentration on the text "as such", the text "itself - a curious 
idea for a deconstructionist, I should think, in any case virtually unacceptable to a 
hermeneuticist, but especially widespread in Miller -, deconstruction is like new 
criticism returned with a vengeance (as de Man said: the new critics did not read 
close enough! Cf. Eaves/Fischer, eds., 142). Deconstruction's prime interest is to 
"interpret as exactly as possible the oscillations in meaning produced by the 
irreducible figurative nature of language" (Miller, "Function" 13), its maxim is 
never to forget "the decisive function of figurative language in making meaning 
heterogeneous or undecidable" (Miller, "Function" 18). Its business is intrinsic 
through and through,7 and if a text refers to anything at all, it is, most probably, to 
another one. This conviction is shared by all the American deconstructors in 
question, even by Harold Bloom ('Texts don't have meanings, except in their 
relations to other texts, so that there is something uneasily dialectical about 
literary meaning. [...] A text is a relational event, and not a substance to be 
analyzed." "Necessity" 274), whose psychologically tinged theory of "poetic 
misprision" or creative misreading - which I shall not expound here - is at its core 
as deconstructive as deconstruction can be, as Paul de Man pointed out in his 
review of Bloom's The Anxiety of Influence.* And if Bloom now affirms that "every 
received text - even Shakespeare, even the Bible - is secondary", and that his 
students are primary, "they are the text. The Bible or Shakespeare is a 
commentary upon them. There are no texts. There are only ourselves" (Salusinszky 
73), this only goes to show how easily a textualism or lingualism collapses into 
Cf. Miller in Eaves/Fischer, eds., 101: "A metaphysical method of literary study assumes that 
literature is in one way or another referential, in one way or another grounded in something 
outside language. This something may be physical objects, or "society", or the economic 
realities of labor, valuation, and exchange. It may be consciousness, the Cogito, or the 
unconscious, or absolute spirit, or God. An antimetaphysical or "deconstructive" form of 
literary study attempts to show that in a given work of literature, in a different way in each 
case, metaphysical assumptions are both present and at the same time undermined by the 
text itself. They are undermined by some figurative play within the text which forbids it to be 
read as an "organic unity" organized around some version of the logos. The play of tropes 
leaves an inassimilable residue or remnant of meaning, an unearned increment, so to speak, 
making a movement of sense beyond any unifying boundaries. The following out of the 
implications of the play of tropes leads to a suspension of fully rationalizable meaning in the 
experience of an aporia or boggling of the mind. This boggling sets up an oscillation in 
meaning. Dialectical opposites capable of synthesis may break down into contradictory 
elements which are differences among the same." 
Cf. de Man, Review of Bloom's Anxiety 273: "We can forget about the temporal scheme and 
about the pathos of the oedipal son; underneath, the book deals with the difficulty or, rather, 
the impossibility of reading and, by inference, with the indeterminacy of literary meaning. If 
we are willing to set aside the trappings of psychology, Bloom's essay has much to say on the 
encounter between latecomer and precursor as a displaced version of the pragmatic 
encounter between reader and text." 
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subjectivism or even solipsism. Again, the volte face is in the logic of that ap­
proach, and the Romantics' desire to "overcome" - one way or another, either by 
annihilation and submission or by totalization of the self - "the split between 
subject and object, between the self and the world" (cf. Davis/Schleifer, eds. 15, 
the words are René Wellek's from Frye, ed., 132) shines through. 
But whenever language and thought are conceived of as being coextensive, the 
discourse cannot help but indicate tacitly an acknowledgement of its limitations. 
Whether it is Romanticism's or deconstruction's discourse, its "other" is always 
inscribed: 
Every construction, every system - that is, every text - has within itself the 
ignorance of its own exterior as the rupture of its coherence which it cannot 
account for. No text can remove itself from a relation to the extralinguistic, and 
none can determine that relation. This undecidable relation to what it is 
constantly related to, prevents the text from closing into a totality. The un-
decidability of its referentiality means that the text is open, and so fragmentary, 
at every point. (Frey in Brooks et al., eds., 132, cf. Miller, Ethics 56ff.) 
But it is in the way they deal with this "outside" that Romanticism and decon­
struction differ most profoundly. The last part will show why Romanticism and 
deconstruction are distant relations only and that the closeness the deconstructors 
insinuate is of an elective kind only. 
V Distant relations and elective affinities 
William Wordsworth was afraid that if language were regarded as a mere dress 
of thought, then it would be "a counter-spirit, unremittingly and noiselessly at work 
to derange, to subvert, to lay waste, to vitiate, and to dissolve" (2: 85). This 
characterization of language matches strikingly the idea the deconstructors have of 
the workings of language in general, although they oppose as violently as 
Wordsworth did the notion that thought and expression can be separated. Why is it 
that the evil spirit has entered the house of language although its guardians have 
subscribed to what Wordsworth saw as the "correct" view? 
It has been shown -1 hope, convincingly - that philosophies which assert the 
identity of language and thinking at one point or another collapse into linguistic 
and epistemological scepticism. In this, Romanticism and deconstruction do not 
differ. They do share basic convictions as to the relation of language and thought -
and run into similar difficulties because of them. But when we read the 
deconstructors' readings of the Romantics, we immediately see where the 
difference comes in. The deconstructors are not interested in the obvious, large-
scale contradictions and aporias of Romanticism, for which I gave a few examples 
150 
above. They accept these as a matter of course. What they are interested in is the 
hardly noticeable rifts and contradictions, the small-scale aporias which have so far 
escaped the notice of traditional criticism. Deconstruction detects the fissures and 
strains in the very building material of Romantic texts and delights in showing how 
easily collapsible seemingly solid and harmless poems are. The crisis has 
deepened, doubt has percolated all the way through, from a doubt about the 
sayability of the unsayable to a doubt about the sayability of anything. In this, 
Romanticism and deconstruction are radically opposed. And in nothing is this 
difference more obvious than in the diametrically opposed conclusions they draw 
from their insight into the essentially figurative nature of language. For the 
Romantics it was clear that if language is figurative and metaphorical through and 
through, then truth can only be attained through figurality. For the deconstructors, 
following Nietzsche, it is clear that then it cannot be attained at all. 
Derrida observed that "everything became discourse" the moment the trans­
cendental signifier - be it God, Reason, or Man, or whatever - was found out to be 
a fiction. It seems to me that this loss of a transcendental perspective still ails the 
deconstructors more than they dare admit. There is in Derrida an unmistakable 
suffering and a quarrel with that nothing that cannot be named9 that sometimes 
puts him close to negative theology and mysticism. The yearning for transcendence 
is equally discernible in Miller (cf. Arac 11) and Bloom, though maybe less so in 
Hartman. In de Man only we find the sardonic smile of the detached sceptic who, 
unperturbed, looks upon the touching vanity of soi-disant human understanding 
(cf. Hartman, Fate 309). 
Cf. Derrida, Wie nicht sprechen , and the following exchange in Fabb et al., eds., 260/261: 
Jonathan Culler: I imagine many people here were puzzled by your remark a few moments 
ago that you had never said that the metaphysics of presence was bad, I was wondering 
whether you would care to explain, first by expanding on the remark that followed it - that 
there is no good outside metaphysics of presence - and then perhaps say a word or two about 
what then drives the impetus to deconstruct the metaphysics of presence. Derrida: I start at 
the end because it could be a way of answering the first part of your question. I often ask 
myself: why insist on deconstructing something which is so good? And the only answer I have 
is something which contradicts, in ourselves, or in myself, the desire for this good. But where 
does this contradiction come from? First, I give it a name which sometimes I write with a 
capital letter, that is, Necessity · and I write this word with a capital letter just to emphasise 
the fact that it's a singular necessity, as a single person. I have to deal with Necessity itself. It 
is something or someone, some x, which compels me to admit that my desire, for good, for 
presence, my own metaphysics of presence, not only cannot be accomplished, meets its limit, 
but should not be accomplished because the accomplishment or the fulfilment of the desire 
for presence would be death itself; the good, the absolute good, would be identical with 
death. At the same time, the one whom I call Necessity teaches me, in a very violent way, to 
admit that my desire cannot be fulfilled, that there is no presence, that presence is always 
divided and split and marked by differences, by spacing, etc. So this is on the one hand a bad 
limit, something which m'empêche de jouir pleinement, but at the same time is the condition 
of my desire, and if such limits were erased this would be death, this will be death. 
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But the American deconstructors never descend to the downright cynicism of a 
Baudrillard. In them there is still a glimmer, albeit faint, of commitment to that 
ongoing project which for the Romantics was part and parcel of their philosophical 
outfit, but which has, in the meantime, not only been discredited but also been 
declared obsolete as just another one of the "great tales" - the project of 
Enlightenment. A lot of what the Romantics did can be seen as a supplement to a 
concept of reason and enlightenment that they judged to be incomplete or too 
narrow. Bloom knows that "The polemic of Romantic poetry (...) is directed 
against inadequate accounts of reason, not against reason itself, they "reason with 
a later reason" (Blake) ('To Reason" 97) against "instrumental" versions of it. But 
they did not question the enterprise. For them, there was a transcendental signifier 
(whatever names they gave it), a something that - not without doubts and crises for 
them - gave sense and meaning to what they did, a "presence" (in Derrida's terms) 
primarily experienced as an obligation. This is lacking in deconstruction. 
As I have shown in my essay on paradox, deconstruction turns to Romanticism 
because Romanticism is sufficiently different from its own discourse and because 
in its seeming consistency it presents a good prey - though not an easy one - to 
deconstruction's interpretive moves. Here, I hope to have shown that Romanticism 
and deconstruction are sufficiently similar to regard the latter as a late offshoot of 
the former. But whenever deconstruction turns to Romanticism because there it 
hopes to find either something akin and congenial to itself or something 
attractively different, the result of that elective affinity is necessarily a 
transformation in both. "Elective affinity" is originally a term from physics and 
chemistry (Torbern Bergman, De attractionibus electivis, 1775), denoting, among 
other things, the chemical attraction of acids and alkalis, which results in a totally 
new substance, changing each component from what it is into something else (e.g. 
sodium and chlorine into table salt) (see McFarland, Romanticism 327ff., Miller 
"'Buchstäbliches' Reading"). That is why the relation of Romanticism to 
deconstruction, distant anyhow, is also an elective affinity in its original sense: their 
encounters leave neither unchanged. 
And what, finally, of language and thought? Of course, one can say that all 
there is is language. But then one would always have to admit that, invariably and 
inevitably, the rest is Silence. 
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